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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relationships among being paid via different variable pay systems, perceptions 
regarding selected work environment characteristics, and preferences regarding selected variable pay plans. The 
data highlight the importance of studying pay system preferences among those with significant work experience 
because measurement of such variables as experience with variable pay systems and perceptions of work 
environment characteristics is otherwise not possible.  The findings suggest a link between perceptions of work 
autonomy, efficient management of firm resources and job support, pay satisfaction, experience with variable pay 
systems and preferences regarding selected variable pay systems.  
 
Keywords:  variable pay; profit sharing; performance bonus; commission-based pay; risk orientation; job 
support; work autonomy; pay satisfaction.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Variable pay plans continue to grow in popularity, increasing from 47% of American companies offering some 
type of variable pay plan in 1990 to 88% offering such plans in 2009 (Abosch & Malague, 2010).  Research 
indicates that pay-for-performance perceptions are strongly related to measures of pay satisfaction (Heneman, 
Greenberger & Strasser, 1988).  A review of empirical investigations of merit pay by Heneman (1992) revealed 
that managers were very consistent in ranking merit as the number one preferred criterion for pay adjustment 
decisions.  However, employees may have different preferences for types of merit pay, based on individual and/or 
organizational characteristics.  For example, college students expressed a preference for individual-based pay 
systems over team-based systems (Cable & Judge, 1994; Kuhn & Yockey, 2003) and preferred employers 
utilizing individually-oriented pay for performance reward systems (Bretz & Judge, 1994). LeBlanc and Mulvey 
(1998) reported on a survey of American workers that found workers preferred rewards based on individual 
performance rather than team, group or company performance.  In this paper, we examine several characteristics 
that may influence individuals’ preferences for different variable pay plans. 
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2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Literature review 
 
Compensation systems utilizing performance bonuses and profit sharing can be based on success sharing or risk 
sharing (Clark, 1996).  In a success sharing contingent pay plan, employees are assured of receiving the agreed 
upon base pay (assumed to be at market level), with the possibility of additional pay depending on individual 
and/or organization performance.  Risk sharing contingent pay systems place a portion of base pay at risk and, 
depending on employee and/or organization performance, provide employees with the possibility of replacing the 
base pay at risk, plus the possibility of earnings beyond the market level base pay.  Empirical research suggests 
that pay-at-risk incentive plans have a negative impact on pay satisfaction, even among those whose earnings 
were greater under the pay-at-risk plan than any previous pay plan (Brown & Huber, 1992).   
 
Individual characteristics may also impact pay system preferences.  Research indicates risk-averse workers have a 
greater inclination to quit when employed by a firm with a variable pay component in the compensation plan 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989). Risk-averse job seekers displayed a preference for a fixed pay system of 
compensation (guaranteed annual salary) over a variable pay system where bonuses were linked to measures of 
organization success (Cable & Judge, 1994).    
 
Empirical research also suggests that pay increases based on an assessment of individual performance are 
preferred over a system linking pay increases to group or organization performance (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Cable 
& Judge, 1994; Kuhn & Yockey, 2003; LeBlanc & Mulvey, 1998).  Other research based on samples of hourly 
employees suggests that a system in which some hourly wages are at risk are least preferred (Brown & Huber, 
1992; Schwab & Wallace, 1974).  To investigate preferences between the various types of pay plans, we offer the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individual performance bonuses are preferred to profit sharing plans (an organization wide 
group reward system), and profit sharing plans are preferred to commission-based pay plans (a system in 
which at least some of one’s base salary is at risk).  
 
In their survey of American workers, LeBlanc and Mulvey (1998) found that 80 percent of respondents paid 
under a contingent pay system reported they would prefer a different pay system.  The authors suggested that 
traditional merit pay is probably the preferred “other system.”  Schwab and Wallace (1974) and Brown and Huber 
(1992) report research results that suggest hourly employees prefer the traditional wage system of compensation.  
Despite early theory linking motivation, performance and pay (Vroom, 1964), these findings suggest that 
employees paid under such systems experience pay dissatisfaction and prefer a pay system without a variable pay 
component.  
 
Additionally, research pertaining to sorting suggests a different relationship.  The sorting literature assumes that 
job applicants use compensation systems as one mechanism for assessing their overall fit with an organization and 
its culture (Dineen, Noe & Ash, 2002; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lazear, 2000; Stevens & Ash, 2001).  This line of 
research seeks to identify features of a compensation system that trigger turnover and which attract new 
employees who fit the compensation system (Dohman & Falk, 2011; Eriksson & Villeval, 2008; Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003, Lazear, 2000).  For example, an individual-based variable pay system may be very attractive to 
applicants who believe they are highly skilled, while candidates who perceive themselves as average or below 
average performers may seek to avoid such a pay system.  Given that the literature reviewed above suggests 
different relationships between having some form of variable pay in one’s current job and variable pay 
preferences with regard to future employment, we seek to investigate the following research question.  
 
Research Question 1: Is being paid a bonus or commission in one’s current job related to future preferences for 
variable pay systems (profit sharing, performance bonus and commission)?  
 
In discussing Expectancy Theory and performance-based pay, Milkovich, Newman and Gerhart (2011) emphasize 
the importance of employees’ assessments of their ability to perform their job and having performance goals 
linked to contingent pay.  This led Milkovich et al. (2011) and others to assert that “line of sight” is critical in the 
design of contingent pay schemes—employees must believe they can attain performance targets that trigger 
incentives and bonuses (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Pazy & Ganzach, 2009).   
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Perceived support of supervisors has been shown to be an important predictor of performance when pay is tied to 
performance (Pazy & Ganzach, 2009).  We suggest that perceptions of the support present in one’s job 
environment (e.g., competent managers, well maintained equipment, coworker support and reasonable 
performance standards) have a positive impact on estimates of one’s chances of attaining the performance goals 
which trigger variable pay rewards. Therefore, we expect to find employee perceptions regarding job support to 
be positively related to preferences regarding variable pay systems.  This leads to the hypothesis below.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of job support are positively related to preferences regarding variable pay 
systems.  
 
Along with the availability of resources needed to perform one’s job, individuals also need to have the autonomy 
to use these resources, as they deem appropriate, to achieve performance goals (Hackman & Oldham, 1976).  
Workers experiencing greater control over their job (i.e., freedom to decide how to do their work) perceive that 
they are better able to impact their performance goals.  As a result, we expect workers with greater perceived 
autonomy in the performance of their jobs to express a stronger desire for pay systems that tie compensation to 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived job autonomy is positively related to preferences for variable pay plans.  
 
In addition to individual and organizational characteristics, an important predictor of preferences regarding 
variable pay systems is likely to be satisfaction with one’s current pay.  As noted earlier, Heneman et al. (1988) 
reported that one of the primary determinants of pay satisfaction is the extent to which individuals believe that the 
pay they receive is related to their own performance. Based on this finding, individuals who report dissatisfaction 
with their current pay may prefer a pay system that directly rewards their own performance.  Alternatively, many 
organizations offer profit sharing plans as incentives.  These plans typically provide rewards based on 
organization-wide performances that are distributed without regard to individual performance.  Profit sharing 
plans enable organizations to shift some risk associated with profit variability to employees, especially in firms 
with high employment growth (Kruse, 1996).  A recent study of over 150 firms, however, found higher turnover 
when group incentive plans were utilized (e.g., profit sharing plans) (Guthrie, 2000).  This study suggested that 
free-riding caused high performing individuals to prefer rewards based on individual efforts.  From this, we 
wondered whether pay satisfaction and the link between pay and individual performance extends to organization-
wide reward systems.  Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis and research question:   
 
Hypothesis 4:  Satisfaction with one’s current pay is negatively related to preferences for individual-based 
variable pay plans (bonuses and commission-based pay).   
 
Research Question 2: Is pay satisfaction negatively related to preferences for profit sharing plans?  
 
2.2 Control variables to consider 
 
Research suggests that gender, age, and salary are related to the importance of pay as well as pay satisfaction 
(Lawler, 1971).  Research also suggests that men place more importance on performance-based pay than women 
(Heneman, 1992; Koys et al., 1989).  Consequently, age, gender and current salary are included as control 
variables in our analysis.  As noted above, risk orientation is related to pay system preferences.  Zenger (1994) 
and Zenger and Marshall (2000) report evidence that organization size may be negatively related to employee 
preferences regarding variable pay systems.  These variables are entered as control variables in our analysis.  
 
3.  Research Methods 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) collected the data utilized in this study for the Graduate 
Management Admissions Council. The data collection involved a random sampling process of first year graduate 
students from institutions offering programs leading to an MBA or MBA-equivalent degree.  Participating schools 
agreed to write a letter to students encouraging them to complete the survey.  Completed surveys were mailed 
directly to NORC in a pre-addressed, stamped envelope. 
 
A total of 2,054 responses were received from a random sample of 2,794 full-time and part-time students, 
resulting in a 73.5% response rate.  
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Given the focus of our study, our analysis was limited to those respondents who were employed full-time and had 
more than 12 months of work experience since graduating from college. This, along with missing data, reduced 
the number of respondents for our analysis to 462. The modal respondent was a 28 year old male (62%) who 
worked in an organization employing between 2,000 and 5,000 workers, had worked for five years since college, 
changed jobs once since graduation and had worked with the current employer for 3.5 years. 
 
3.2 Measures   
 
Respondents provided information concerning the following: age, gender, total annual salary, company size and 
whether part of their annual compensation was based on a performance bonus or commission.  The variable pay 
measures (bonus and commission) were coded as dummy variables (no = 0; yes = 1).  
 
Measures of job support, autonomy and pay satisfaction were taken from the 1972-1973 Quality of Employment 
Survey (Quinn & Shepard, 1974).  The alpha coefficient for the 11 item job support scale was .88.  Example items 
are: The people I work with are helpful to me in getting my job done; I receive enough help and equipment to get 
my job done. The autonomy measure was comprised of four items with an alpha coefficient of .75. A sample item 
is:  I am given a lot of freedom to decide how I do my own work.  The procedure used in this study to measure 
work-related characteristics relied directly on the perceptions of the respondents, and is methodologically 
appropriate (Hackman & Lawler, 1971). 
 
Pay satisfaction was assessed using the following statement: The pay is good.        
 
Risk orientation was assessed with the following item:  Suppose you owned a lottery ticket that had a 50% chance 
of paying nothing and a 50% chance of paying $100.  What is the lowest price you would sell the ticket for?  
WRITE IN NUMBER OF DOLLARS.  $__ __ __ Dollars.     
 
The approach to measuring risk-attitude represented by the above item is the selling price lottery method 
(Pennings & Smidts, 2000; Slovic, 1972).  Slovic (1972) reported high reliabilities for this method.  Pennings and 
Smidts (2000) studied the predictive validity of the lottery approach and judged this method to be appropriate 
when predicting market behavior and choices.   
 
Three dependent variables were measured in the current study.  Respondents were asked to indicate how 
important each of the following would be in choosing a place of employment:  profit-sharing plan, performance 
bonuses and commissions.  These items were scored on a four-point scale ranging from “not too important” to 
“extremely important.”   Preferences regarding each of the pay plans were assessed with a single item measure.  
In addition, risk orientation and pay satisfaction were assessed with single-item measures.  Regarding the validity 
of a single-item scale, Sweeney, McFarlin and Inderrieden (1990) found the same results when using a single item 
measure of pay satisfaction and a three-item measure developed by Andrews and Withey (1976). In addition, 
Nagy (2002) reported that single-item facet measures of job satisfaction were strongly correlated with the 
corresponding multi-item facets of the Job Descriptive Index (JDI). 
 
4.  Results 
 
Paired t-tests show clear support for hypothesis 1.  The mean preference ratings for performance bonuses, profit 
sharing and commission-based pay are: 3.16, 2.99 and 1.76, respectively.  The paired t-test results revealed 
performance bonuses were preferred over profit sharing (t = 3.45, df = 474, sig. < .001), and profit sharing was 
preferred over commission-based pay (t = 21.50, df = 474, sig. < .0001). 
 
Multiple regression results pertaining to research question 1 suggest that being paid a bonus in one’s current job is 
associated with more positive preferences regarding performance bonuses in the future.  Similarly, being paid a 
commission is associated with more positive preferences regarding commission-based pay.  
 
Perceived job support is associated with positive preferences regarding commission-based pay, but unrelated to 
preferences for performance bonuses.  Perceived job support is negatively associated with preferences regarding 
profit sharing. Thus, hypothesis 2 is, at best, partially supported. 
 
Partial support for hypothesis 3 is also observed.  Those who report greater perceived autonomy in the 
performance of their work have more positive preferences with regard to performance bonus and profit sharing 
systems.  However, perceived autonomy is not related to commission-based pay preferences.   
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Hypothesis 4, which predicted a negative relationship between pay satisfaction and preferences for performance 
bonuses and commissioned-based pay, is supported.  Individuals who are dissatisfied with their current pay 
expressed a stronger preference for individual-oriented variable pay systems in future employment.  Regarding 
Research Question 2, the relationship between pay satisfaction and profit sharing plans, although negative, is not 
significant.  
  
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
 
5.1 Discussion of results 
 
The results of our study indicate that among the common variable pay systems investigated here, performance 
bonuses are clearly the preferred option for full-time workers with some job experience.   This is consistent with 
previous research which reported that when presented with a choice between variable pay linked to individual 
performance or group performance, the former is the preferred option (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Cable & Judge, 
1994; Kuhn & Yockey, 2003; LeBlanc & Mulvey, 1998).  In the context of making future employment decisions, 
about 43 percent of our respondents report performance bonuses to be “extremely important,” compared to 28 
percent who describe profit sharing as “extremely important,” and just 7 percent who rated commission-based pay 
as “extremely important.”  The results of this study are also consistent with findings reported by Brown and 
Huber (1992), as well as Schwab and Wallace (1974).  Individual-oriented success sharing plans are more popular 
than group-oriented success sharing plans, and both are much more popular than individual-oriented risk sharing 
plans.  In addition to supporting earlier findings, we extend earlier research by using a sample that consists 
primarily of exempt workers with an average of five years of work experience (following their bachelor studies).  
 
The regression analyses (Table 1) find employee age and company size are both negatively related to the 
importance of performance bonuses, and risk seeking is positively related to the importance of performance 
bonuses.  These findings are consistent with research reported by Zinger (1994) and Zinger and Marshall (2000).  
In addition, the relationship between risk orientation and performance bonus preferences reported by Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1989), Cable and Judge (1994) as well as Dohmen and Falk (2011) is confirmed.  These 
findings regarding risk orientation and performance bonus preferences contribute to existing theory by extending 
existing findings to college-educated members of the labor force with extensive work experience; earlier studies 
were based on samples of college students.   
 
With respect to Research Question 1, having part of one’s current annual compensation in the form of 
performance bonuses is positively related to performance bonus preferences, and having part of one’s current 
annual compensation in the form of commissions is positively related to preferences regarding commission-based 
pay.  Sorting provides a possible explanation for these findings.  The sorting hypothesis suggests that variable pay 
schemes which link pay and performance attract more productive workers, and that less productive workers find 
such pay arrangements unattractive.  Eriksson and Villeval (2008) as well as Dohmen and Falk (2011) find that 
among student subjects, high performers are attracted to variable pay systems and low performers are attracted to 
fixed pay systems. Lazear (2000) reported sorting effects when a fixed wage system was replaced by a piece rate 
with guarantee system among non-exempt workers at Safelite Glass Company.  Relating the sorting hypothesis to 
the positive association we found between being paid with a given variable pay system and preferences regarding 
that variable pay system in future employment, high performers receiving high bonuses or commissions may be 
likely to stay in that job, while low performers receiving low or no bonuses/commissions are likely to leave.  
 
The significant positive association between job support perceptions and commission preferences provides some 
support for Hypothesis 2.  This is consistent with discussions by Milkovich et al. (2011) as well as Gerhart and 
Rynes (2003) regarding “line of sight” and individual contingent pay schemes.  Employees who perceive they 
have the necessary information, resources and other support to reach performance goals have more positive 
perceptions of commission-based pay.  However, the finding that job support is negatively related to profit 
sharing preferences is contrary to our hypothesis.  Instead, the observed relationship suggests that positive views 
regarding profit sharing are associated with the perception that resources are limited and one has challenging 
performance goals.  It appears that when employees believe management maintains tight control of resources and 
sets demanding performance goals, employees have more positive views regarding profit sharing plans.  This is 
similar to Locke and Latham’s (1990) theory that challenging goals help focus individual efforts towards 
achieving a target, creating a sort of “tunnel vision” that yields greater persistence over time.   
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Taken together, it may be that profit sharing, coupled with tight control of resources, causes employees to view 
exerting effort and persisting towards goals that yield profit sharing payouts (i.e., goals requiring more long-term 
effort and persistence) as more attainable.  A related explanation is suggested by case studies of Microsoft 
(Bartlett, 2001) and Lincoln Electric (Fast & Berg, 1983).  Both case studies describe a work environment in 
which resources are limited and closely monitored so there are no unnecessary expenses, and employees are 
“stretched” to attain performance goals.  When employees believe that management maintains tight control of 
resources, including headcount, and sets demanding performance goals, employees may have more positive 
preferences regarding organization-wide incentive systems such as profit sharing plans.   
 
The hypothesis addressing the association between work autonomy and variable pay preferences also receives 
some support.  We find that individuals who perceive they have autonomy in the performance of their jobs prefer 
performance bonus systems (beta = .17) and profit sharing systems (beta = .19).  The relationship between work 
autonomy and performance bonuses is consistent with research reported by Turban and Keon (1993), 
Montemayor (1995), and Ramamoorthy and Carroll (1998).  They all reported that in situations characterized by 
high autonomy, reward systems keyed to individual performance and merit are preferred.  Our findings confirm 
earlier findings from studies using student samples and extend existing theory to better understand preferences of 
experienced individuals who are employed on a full-time basis. 
 
Our final hypothesis focused on the relationship between pay satisfaction and both individual and group 
contingent pay system preferences.  The results suggest that satisfaction with one’s current pay influences future 
preferences for particular variable pay systems.  Individuals who report dissatisfaction with their current pay 
indicate a greater preference for pay systems that directly link pay and individual performance. Although not 
statistically significant, the relationship between pay satisfaction and preferences for profit sharing plans in future 
employment is also negative.  The directionality of these results is consistent with Guthrie’s (2000) study in 
which group incentive plans (i.e., profit-sharing) led to greater turnover, although it is unknown whether this is 
due to free-riding. 
 
5.2. General discussion and implications 
 
Our findings regarding performance bonus preferences are largely consistent with earlier research.  The principal 
contribution of our study is that our sample consists of respondents with several years of full-time work 
experience following completion of their bachelor studies, while many of the earlier studies involved college 
students without full-time work experience.  Insofar as our findings are consistent with such earlier studies, one 
can have greater confidence that the relationships reported by these earlier studies apply to employed members of 
the labor force.  In addition, our findings highlight the importance of studying pay system preferences among 
those with significant work experience, because measurement of variables such as being paid in part through a 
particular variable pay system, job support, work autonomy and pay satisfaction is not possible with traditional 
college student samples. We believe that our investigation provides evidence that contributes to our understanding 
of employee preferences regarding the forms of variable pay systems studied here.  First, we observe a positive 
relationship between having been paid with a given variable pay system (performance bonus or commission) and 
preferences with respect to that variable pay system.  These findings may stem from sorting effects attributable to 
the presence of performance bonuses and commission-based pay in the compensation system of some 
organizations.   
 
Second, a positive relationship between job support and perceptions regarding commission-based pay and a 
negative relationship between job support and perceptions regarding profit sharing plans are observed. The 
relationship between job support and commission-based pay suggests that ample resources are important when 
base pay is at risk.  On the other hand, the negative relationship between job support and profit sharing 
preferences can be interpreted as evidence that lower level management and professional employees perceive a 
positive link between efficient use of company resources, challenging performance goals and profit sharing 
payouts.  We also found a positive relationship between work autonomy and both profit sharing as well as 
performance bonus preferences.  This suggests that among lower level management and professional employees, 
control over the performance of one’s job is positively related to preferences regarding both organization-wide 
variable pay plans (profit sharing) and individual performance bonus systems.  
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5.3 Study limitations  
 
This investigation has limitations and shortcomings. The use of single-item measures of preferences regarding 
forms of variable pay is a limitation.  In addition, all data are self-report responses collected concurrently, which 
raise issues of common method variance.  However, we believe that the nature of the sample and the variables 
studied offer advantages that offset data collection issues.  Because our sample consists of individuals with 
several years of work experience, they can more realistically report whether their current compensation includes a 
performance bonus or commission component.  They can also report perceptions regarding job support, work 
autonomy and job satisfaction.  In addition, our study surveyed a nation-wide sample of managers or those who 
aspire to be managers.  As a consequence, there was a high degree of realism when they were asked to report the 
importance of selected variable pay systems in making labor market choices. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In closing, our findings indicate the importance of considering satisfaction with current pay when investigating 
preferences regarding variable pay systems in future employment decisions, especially since pay satisfaction is 
negatively associated with both performances bonus and commission preferences—two common incentive plans. 
Taken together, we believe these findings provide new evidence regarding experience with particular pay systems, 
perceptions of one’s employment conditions and the influence of such perceptions of rewards systems in current 
and future employment situations.   
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Table1: Regression Analysis Results: Preferences Regarding Variable Pay Systems 
 
 
 
                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Profit 
        Sharing* 
      Performance 
         Bonus* 
        Commission* 
 
Age    -.03  -.10 a  -.04  
Gender (male=1)    .05  .03  .02 
Salary    .02  .03  .02 
Risk Orientation    .05  .13 b  .03 
Company Size    -.03  -.11b  .00 
Paid Bonus    .02  .15b  .09  
Paid Commission    -.05  -.02  .23c 
Job Support    -.10 a  -.02   .10 a 
Autonomy    .19 c  .17 c  .01 
Satisfaction with pay    -.08  -.13 a  -.20 c 
F    2.87c  5.10c  5.28c 
Df    10/446  10/446  10/446 
R2    .06  .10  .11 
*Standardized beta coefficients.  Significance: a. ≤ .05; b ≤ .01; c ≤ .001 
